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What place should the study of ultimate values or beliefs have in socio-legal studies (SLS)? These are values or beliefs held, as Max Weber puts it, for their ‘own sake’;​[1]​ that is, seen by those committed to them as intrinsically worthy and requiring no special justification. It is easy to think of many such beliefs or value commitments that closely relate to law and often have different constituencies of adherents – for example, absolute commitments to human rights, to racial equality, to the sanctity of private property, to liberty of contract, to social welfare or wealth redistribution, to religious freedom, to religious beliefs that seek expression in law, to democracy, and to national sovereignty or national legal autonomy.  Can and should such relatively abstract ideas be studied directly in the empirically focused enterprise of SLS? Or should socio-legal scholars, as hard-headed positivists, leave values to philosophers and jurists except when they are translated in some precise way into positive law? 

This paper argues that SLS should concern itself with ultimate values insofar as these influence law, and social action linked to law. We typically think of law as focused on governmental, citizens’ and corporate interests, and much SLS work brings to light law’s relations with these. But, as Weber noted, ideas associated with ultimate values and beliefs often determine ‘the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest’.​[2]​ Values and interests, however conceptualised, sometimes intertwine in complex and sociologically significant ways.​[3]​

Because values inform action, at least to some extent, they surely inform the activity of socio-legal research itself. What values guide social research on law? Even Weber, who famously insisted that social science must be pursued in a value-free manner and must not be distracted by the value commitments of the researcher, recognised that the choice of topics for research is not likely to be neutral, but will be guided by the researcher’s (or sponsor’s) preferences or by considerations of cultural relevance; and usually these will be interconnected. Value commitments are part of culture. They influence directions of research even for those committed to ‘pure science’ – entirely disinterested inquiry.​[4]​ And the very idea of commitment to science imports perhaps debatable values.​[5]​

Many social researchers find it hard to be disinterested when they see society faced by urgent problems that raise pressing moral issues. A once-famous presidential address to the American Society for the Study of Social Problems was titled ‘Whose Side Are We On?’.​[6]​ However, few professional researchers want to tie themselves very explicitly to the promotion of particular values, unless these can be assumed to be shared almost universally among the audience addressed. Fear of research being dismissed as ‘biased’ or ‘unbalanced’ goes with the felt need for scientific and thus professional respectability. But value questions haunt all social (including socio-legal) research.

Legal scholars of all kinds can also be asked: whose – or what – side are you on?’ Legal scholarship in the common law world does not usually claim to be ‘science’, but it has much the same need as social science for professional respectability. However, unlike most social scientists, jurists can hardly avoid invoking ultimate values, and usually do so readily – for example, about justice (the realisation and administration of it; access to it), doctrinal certainty and consistency, and equality before the law. Perhaps, as these examples suggest, it is process values that lawyers are most comfortable with, often seeing them as inbuilt in their structures of professional expertise. 

In some sense, therefore, law is always seen in terms of values. So it is possible to ask: whose or what side is law on? It was the asking of this question which surely impelled many legal scholars to become the pioneers of SLS. But the impulse towards professionalization and the realities of securing research support tend to marginalise efforts to pursue overt value critique, just as they did with radical criminology after it started to question core value structures of societies in which crime arises.​[7]​

In what follows I shall, first, discuss two topical illustrations to show how the meaning of ultimate values is sometimes raised in practice as an urgent legal issue, and should therefore be treated as part of the socio-legal reality that SLS studies. The paper then sketches some orientations in socio-legal theory that have tended to divert attention from a concern with ultimate values. It goes on to suggest a way of conceptualising values as a component of culture, and illustrates this by reference to aspects of the regulation of religious and ethnic minorities, on the one hand, and business and financial networks, on the other. Finally, it considers implications of SLS’s own commitment to science in considering values and argues that theory can give guidance in judging the importance of ultimate values as a focus for the socio-legal enterprise, and even indicate values that SLS might emphasise.


ULTIMATE VALUES AS A SOCIO-LEGAL CONCERN

In May 2016, two unrelated and contrasting news stories about law and values appeared in the press at the same time. One was headlined ‘Legal fears stall new laws to tackle extremism’.​[8]​ It reported on ‘an eight-month struggle to find a “legally robust” definition of extremism’ that would ‘not be immediately challenged in the courts’. This problem was said to explain ‘the delay in bringing forward [Prime Minister] David Cameron’s flagship legislation to tackle Islamist extremism in Britain’. The definition in the Government’s counter-extremism strategy, focusing on ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values,’ could be legally challenged as infringing rights to freedom of speech. 

What is of special interest here is that the idea of extremism implies ultimate values without conclusively delineating them; it indicates the outer edge of a definitional vacuum; actions or attitudes beyond an unclear range of normative acceptability. An ‘extreme’ person, in one dictionary definition, is someone ‘advocating severe or drastic measures; immoderate in opinion’​[9]​ but the criteria against which to judge these measures or opinions are not necessarily specified, and may be just assumed. A politician was quoted in the press reports as saying that the Home Office ‘know what they dislike but they can’t describe it’. What is implied in the effort at legal definition is a compendium of ultimate values seemingly impossible to express in legal language. ‘Extreme’ appears to mean – though it cannot be legally defined in these terms – outside a range of fundamental values that are to be assumed as universally shared and must be upheld as essential if co-existence is to be secured. ​[10]​  

Why is an effort being made legally to reach these values and police them? The reason is that they are sensed as actually or potentially destabilised because of forms of cultural diversity and associated attitudes and actions thought to be impossible to reconcile with them. Here, surely, is a situation in which socio-legal inquiry becomes essential. What social conditions is law being required to address – and, in particular, what value commitments shape these conditions? Law is required here to identify social problems which it is to address partly in terms of the values underlying them. Law and policy, built on a concept of extremism, are thereby presented as engaged, as a practical matter, directly in value conflict. So, the socio-legal study of how such law and policy operates would necessarily have to address the value commitments that drive it, and those that are thought to define the targets to which it is addressed. Crucially, it is the sense of a dislocation of ultimate values that leads to an effort to make these values explicit, and this sense links the lawmakers’ conundrums here to a second news story dealing with wholly different matters.

On the same day as the ‘extremism’ story, media in several countries reported the quashing by the Italian Court of Cassation, after three lower court trials, of the conviction of a homeless Ukrainian immigrant for the theft of a sausage and a piece of cheese from a Genoa supermarket. The court stated that the ‘condition of the defendant and the circumstances in which the… theft took place’ proved that he took ‘that small amount of food in the face of the immediate and essential need for nourishment’. He acted in a state of need’ and in such circumstances no crime had been committed. An Italian leader writer remarked: ‘For the supreme judges, the right to survival has prevailed over the right to property. In America that would be blasphemy. And here as well, some conformists will talk about a legitimation of proletarian expropriation.’ 

In the absence of a full case report, only opinions reported in the press are available; they refer to such matters as a new application of the necessity defence, a legal right to dignity, the non-violent nature of the theft, the failure of the legal system in requiring three sets of proceedings to decide the case, and corruption and the economic crisis (as the real issues). A commentator in the daily newspaper Corriere della Sera wrote, supporting the decision: ‘As the law is nothing but the box where our living together takes shape, it was unthinkable that jurisprudence did not take reality into account.’​[11]​

Cases of small-scale thefts in tragic circumstances are hardly uncommon. At Kidderminster Magistrates Court in 2015 a woman was fined for stealing a 75p pack of Mars bars although, the court was told, she had stolen ‘the cheapest item she could find because she had not eaten in days since her benefits were sanctioned’.​[12]​ While this is surely morally striking,​[13]​ legally it may not be, as a simple application of positive law. The Italian case, however, directly raises the relation of law and ultimate values as an issue for the court (and society at large) to face. It brings the value of the sanctity of property to the fore, and not in terms of familiar debates around legally enshrined human rights (values expressly put in legal form) but as a fundamental questioning of a normally silently presupposed, implicit value that underpins law. 

The fact that the case attracted international media attention hints at its socio-legal interest, as symptomatic of an at least partial destabilisation of the fundamental, underlying value of private property, one of the crucial value pillars of private law. The thread of readers’ comments after the Guardian report​[14]​ of the case reinforces this impression: ‘Theft is theft… but the punishment should reflect the magnitude of the crime’; ‘The man was homeless and broke. Should they have taken his sleeping bag? His jacket?’; ‘In the UK steal [sic] £490 million from pensions – punished with a knighthood’; ‘Leaving people to starve in the street is a crime’; ‘…the real offence was caused by the state because of its abandonment of the poor’. Reference is made to wider economic circumstances, disparities of wealth and the fragility of social support structures. 

The case, from this point of view, highlights one aspect a larger socio-legal reality also reflected in the mass media through reports of ‘aggressive’ tax avoidance or tax manipulation by those with access to the knowledge and resources to engage in it, the growth of vast disparities of wealth between the richest one per cent and the rest, and suspicions of widespread financial corruption – all of these being issues that presuppose and rely on, yet also contextualise and potentially subvert, the ultimate value of sanctity of property.

With regard to tax avoidance and related matters, issues for socio-legal attention may not be mainly about obtaining empirical evidence because much evidence is made readily available by means (including journalistic investigative reporting and the large-scale leaking of electronic files) that bypass the usual methods of academic socio-legal inquiry. Issues may centre instead significantly on the relation of law to ultimate values;​[15]​ for example, the influence of popular and official value-orientations on the operation of law. 

Tax avoidance as the legitimate protection of one’s property is ‘tax efficiency’ or ‘tax planning’.​[16]​ From some viewpoints it is not only morally blameless but praiseworthy and linked directly to values of liberty, privacy and security, as well as sanctity of property. Insofar as values, as Weber says, mark ‘tracks along which action’ is ‘pushed by the dynamic of interest’, the promotion of ultimate values may not only legitimise the behaviour of individuals and corporate actors but influence the attitudes of courts and enforcement agents in some matters of regulatory policy.​[17]​ 

There is a role for socio-legal theory in areas such as this, to explore how powerfully defended structures of absolute values link with attitudes to law, and to practices of legal interpretation and application; as well as to perceptions of the nature of private and public interests and of how these interests may properly be pursued. 


HOW INSTRUMENTALISM MARGINALISES VALUES

A concern with values as a specific focus for socio-legal research may seem strange, even eccentric, although a minority of scholars – for example, Philip Selznick among modern writers, and Émile Durkheim among the sociological classics – have adopted such a concern.​[18]​ One danger in adopting it is that of forgetting that values are sociologically significant only insofar as people, individually or collectively, actually recognise them as important; so, their social salience is always relative to time and place.​[19]​ Though such values are often treated as absolutes, their relevance as social phenomena depends on the contingencies of their acceptance and the ways in which they are defined and interpreted. The focus, therefore, has to be on values having meaning in specific social contexts, not as timeless objects of philosophical analysis. 

Long established theoretical traditions militate, however, against a socio-legal focus on values. They tend to reinforce a narrow view of the nature of law as techniques, practices and norms – narrow because it underestimates law’s potential cultural significance and its power to reinforce and help to constitute broad understandings of the nature of the social world.​[20]​ As has often been noted, powerful theoretical traditions and wider currents of common-sense understanding of the nature of law reinforce an instrumental view of it and also a view of social life as structured primarily around instrumental action, rather than giving due weight to the significance of action shaped by commitments to ultimate values or beliefs. In much socio-legal research, as in much legal practice and experience, law has been seen primarily as a tool of government and as a resource by means of which actors (citizens, corporations, groups) pursue their private purposes or protect their interests.​[21]​

If one dominant theoretical influence underpins this view of modern law and society it is surely that of Weber. While he in no way denies the important place that value-commitments play in influencing or giving meaning to action, or to law, he sees values in modern society as primarily a mass of normative inconsistency and mutually incompatible prescriptions. Since the decline of natural law ideas no consistent value-orientations can be attached to law. Values are limited to distinct spheres of experience.​[22]​ Projected outside these, they become irreconcilable and confused. Modern law certainly incorporates values but in a piecemeal way depending on the particular fields being regulated. Thus, values may provide some of law’s content but are typically subordinated to the formal rational qualities that dominate it. It seems that the only values expected to pervade modern law – to be inherent in it – will be process values of consistency, coherence and predictability. 

The everyday authority that supports modern law appears also to be largely free of any appeal to ultimate values. It is substantially free of ‘charismatic’ or ‘traditional’ elements. The dominant basis of modern authority (legitimate domination) is, for Weber, ‘the belief in legality… compliance with enactments which are formally correct and which have been made in the accustomed manner’​[23]​ – that is, it is based on systems of impersonal rules defining hierarchically organised official positions and their jurisdictions. But Weber seems only partly to support the idea of modern law as self-justifying on the basis of its formal rationality. A better interpretation is that, for him, modern law justifies itself by its obvious usefulness in the pursuit of governmental and private interests;​[24]​ it is merely ‘the product or the technical means of a compromise between conflicting interests’.​[25]​

Much sociology of law has surely largely internalised the kind of perspective on law that Weber theorises. In much legal scholarship it also dominates implicitly. Even human rights are often interpreted legally as categories of legitimate interests so that ultimate humanistic values are legally transformed into specific participation and membership rights.​[26]​ Economic analysis of law, emphasising market efficiency and purpose-rationality as drivers of law, has had only indirect relations with the mainstream of SLS. But sociology has been influenced by rational action theory influenced by rational choice economics.​[27]​ Much sociology of law, too, has been bewitched by concerns with the instrumental effectiveness of legal action and its limits. This is so even where (as often) scholars have critiqued law’s instrumental use, its suitability for such use and its negative ‘impact’ on social life.​[28]​ There has been a tendency to leave aside inquiries about overarching ideologies driving law (at least since Marxist theories fell out of favour), or about cultural values pressed on law for recognition or assumed as underpinnings of law (such as those presupposed in the ‘extremism’ case, discussed earlier, or brought into contention in the Italian one). Admittedly with many exceptions, social research on law has tended to prefer to examine law as instrumental rather than expressive, and as ‘externally’ regulating projects rather than ‘internally’ inhabiting culture.

What would be entailed in seeing law as ‘inhabiting culture’? This might involve attaching much more attention to the nature of law itself as not only an instrument of state regulation but also an aspect of culture. State law’s relation to culture does, indeed, include operating on it instrumentally; and there is no good reason to see instrumental (especially economic) social relations as outside the scope of culture in considering culture’s relation to law. But culture surely includes much more that is legally relevant. 







VALUES IN CULTURE AND COMMUNITY

Ultimate values that inform law in particular social settings can be taken as distinct objects of research – and this has been done to some extent in comparative legal studies. For example James Whitman has extensively explored what he sees as a dichotomy between a fundamental value of liberty that characterises much American law and a contrasting value of dignity that he sees as deeply embedded in continental European law.​[29]​ But this research is controversial and, although based on very intricate comparative examination of legal doctrine, necessarily results in very broad generalisations.​[30]​ 

A more familiar way to include the study of values in socio-legal research is to treat them as one component of culture, perhaps analytically distinguishable but almost invariably implicated in empirically observable social conditions with culture’s other elements. The most feasible way to do this involves first conceptualising culture along the four dimensions mentioned above – (i) instrumental or material aspects especially focused on economic relations; (ii) aspects relating to shared ultimate values or beliefs; (iii) elements of tradition (in the wide sense indicated earlier) focused on conditions of co-existence in a shared environment – such as common language, experience, history, or geographical location; and finally (iv) affective elements of culture – emotional attachments and identities that are not necessarily explicable in terms of any of the other aspects of culture although they may arise from or colour them. One might, for example, simply feel ‘British’ or ‘European’ in the sense of identifying emotionally with a certain society or communal network, or fixing a cultural identity by emotionally rejecting or separating from some other group or nation.

Conceptualising these different dimensions along which culture can be structured is a means to an end. It is a methodological device to help make intellectually manageable the myriad kinds of social relations that law has to regulate and the different kinds of communal relations that give rise to, seek, or support regulation. Such a ‘community lens’ is a way of classifying the radically different types of bonds that stabilise social relations, so as to highlight contrasting features of these types; features that are likely to be significant in considering how these types can be regulated by state law, and how they will relate to law.​[31]​ The differences between them from a regulatory perspective are complex and present a large agenda for research. But it is not hard to recognise that, in general, relations between law and emotion, law and beliefs or ultimate values, law and instrumental (especially economic) relations, and law and tradition are likely to be different in kind. Indeed, the insights of sociology of law, on the one hand, and long juristic experience, on the other, have already illuminated many aspects of the contrasting character of these relations.​[32]​ 

These different elements of culture point to four contrasting ‘pure’ types of communal relations founded on different kinds of bonds – shared instrumental projects, beliefs or values, traditions, or emotional orientations. While they can be separated out for analytical purposes especially because they are likely to give rise to different kinds of regulatory problems or challenges, it is important to emphasise that they are almost invariably combined in complex ways in social life. So, we should speak of communal networks or groups made up of often highly complex combinations of these different, distinguishable types of social bonds.  

Values seen in this way are just part of a complex mix, and it is the complex mixes making up communal networks that carry what can be called culture. So, culture is an ever-shifting pattern of values, beliefs, traditions, projects and allegiances holding these communal networks together. Law addresses culture in this sense, and draws its meaning and relevance from it. Most importantly, culture seen in this way (together with the communal networks that carry it) is not necessarily bounded by the territory and legal jurisdiction of the state. The society inhabiting such a state territory is a communal network, but so are numerous more local groupings and minority populations within it, as well as numerous transnational networks that extend beyond it.​[33]​

Such a perspective shows law interwoven in the social in many different ways – influenced in its operation from different cultural sources and facing different kinds of challenges presented by diverse elements of culture. Such a perspective is obviously different from a ‘linear’ instrumental or causal approach that sees law (a unified entity) as acting on ‘society’ (another unified entity) or, in a reverse formulation,​[34]​ as passively mirroring society. A major part of state law’s activity is devoted to regulating instrumental (especially economic) relations. But even where communal networks are dominated by instrumental relations and law seeks directly to address these, other matters are likely to be implicated: values and beliefs (e.g. shaping understandings of and attitudes to economic activity and state regulation); practices and customs arising from working together in a common business environment; and emotional allegiances or rejections touching on business decisions (e.g. regarding choices of clients or trading partners, or dealings in certain nations). 

Such possible cultural variables suggest why culture should be an important consideration in judging the likely success and optimal strategies of state legal regulation. Indeed, it has been seen as such in important socio-legal research, for example on formal organisations and business regulation.​[35]​ It is now increasingly recognised that problems of effectively regulating corporate structures are often not readily solvable by regulators designing law, however expertly, as an external control on corporate activity – in other words by maximising law’s effect as an instrument applied from ‘outside’ on the ‘internal’ activities of business entities. The reality is, it seems, often much more one of getting inside the culture of communal networks (such as banking and financial systems, corporations and corporate groups, transnational industries and commercial networks) so that law – or other regulation that it encourages – becomes absorbed, interpreted and often transformed in internal business culture rather than appearing (and being resisted) as an invading instrument.​[36]​

From the perspective adopted here culture does not indicate an integrated entity (‘a culture’ or distinct ‘cultures’) but a contingent mix of elements. Culture does not usually have clear boundaries because its instrumental, affective, traditional and beliefs/values aspects may exist, at least to some extent, independently of each other, informing different patterns of social relations, uniting different groups. People are usually involved in many different relations of community at any given time and so they experience aspects of culture in many different ways. But it is reasonable to talk of distinct cultures when the four elements of culture identified in this paper appear more or less exactly superimposed on each other in a particular population or network of social relations: when, for example, the integration of instrumental economic relations is reinforced by the participants’ shared beliefs, the emotional attachments that unite them, and shared traditions that have grown up through constant interaction. 

Such conditions may be especially important foci for socio-legal research insofar as they are ones in which communal networks tend to create their own regulation, and in which resistance to or suspicion of ‘external’ regulation, especially perhaps state law, may develop. Their bounded character, relatively self-contained along all four dimensions of culture, can also mean that they are very hard for state law to penetrate or influence because mutually reinforcing cultural characteristics mark out social limits distinguishing the particular communal network from others.​[37]​ At the extreme it might be possible in theory to observe entirely ‘closed communities’ or groups having absolute cultural separation from others. But it is unlikely that, in modern liberal societies with a highly developed division of labour and very widespread networks of social interdependence, such total isolation of cultures or communities will exist. A real issue for socio-legal research may, however, be how far pressures towards such isolation pose important problems for legal regulation by the state.​[38]​

In relation to powerful communal networks primarily organised for economic or financial activity these problems have been widely recognised. ‘Banking culture’ is often cited as a matter for examination and reform, which may or may not involve a significant involvement of (state or international) law. In some business networks seen as having ‘cultures’ in some such integrated sense, value commitments may be an important part of the cultural mix – for example, to individual liberty (inspiring hostility to state regulation and commitment to contractual freedom), sanctity of property, security and privacy, and the social importance of markets. The socio-legal issue then becomes whether, or how state law or other forms of regulation can engage with such values if they inform and influence kinds of economic action that law is expected to oversee. How can the significance of such values be judged and what are the limits of legal action in engaging with this aspect of culture?

In popular debate such issues about law and culture are much more frequently raised in an entirely different context – that of the cultural pluralism associated with religious or ethnic minority populations. In banking and commercial networks the dominant relations of community integrating these networks culturally can be seen as instrumental – focused on common or convergent economic projects – with other aspects of culture perhaps arranged around these. But in some other communal networks, such as those of Muslim minorities in Western societies, the dominant relations of community are often, more obviously, those of tradition (customs, established or inherited practices of co-existence) or values and beliefs (e.g. rooted in Islamic religious doctrines). Again, there is the possibility that all aspects of culture may converge and be superimposed on each other. 

Thus, economic relations may become significantly co-extensive with bonds of belief or custom (perhaps partly as a result of discrimination from outside the communal network, or the relative ease of establishing understandings within it). Again, affective allegiances to the group and affective rejections of its external environment may sometimes be correspondingly strengthened. But minority networks do not inevitably become significantly ‘closed’ through such processes of cultural overlay and very often do not. Bonds based on belief or values may be diverse and sometimes conflicted because of religious differences; customary practices may vary greatly, especially because of different ethnic group origins and different ongoing transnational ties; economic relations are unlikely as a practical matter to be tightly limited within a network of religious believers or an ethnic group; and emotional allegiances may be complex and variable in such communal networks, even when (and, perhaps, sometimes because) outsiders imagine them as having strong group identity and uniformity.

Where there are tendencies to drift – or be pushed by outside pressures – towards cultural homogeneity, self-regulation often flourishes in well-defined communal networks. Also, these networks tend to resist, reinterpret in their own ways, or distance themselves from state law. The communal network that is the politically organised society of a state produces its own law in a fully juridical sense as state law. Other communal networks produce regulation that may or may not be recognised or labelled as law. Sometimes this internally-generated regulation exists in accommodation with state law, sometimes in recognised subordination to it, or without reference to it, or in effective competition with it. Sometimes it is explicitly promulgated, and sometimes merely implicit, understood by insiders but substantially hidden from the world outside the communal network in which it arises. 

In relatively closed communal networks it is often very difficult for outsiders to study this implicit regulation. It may amount to no more than normative understandings shaped by the shared projects of members, by their value commitments and affective orientations, and in their established common practices. One important reason why it is hard to study empirically the regulatory structures and understandings of some communal networks is the sheer complexity and density of the combinations of cultural elements that shape their internal regulatory structures and the relation of these to state law. 

Perhaps then it is unsurprising that although some communal networks are of central contemporary significance these do not become central foci for socio-legal inquiry. This is the case (despite important research by a relatively small number of specialist socio-legal scholars) with powerful transnational business and financial networks, some of which may appear to have relatively self-contained ‘cultures’. Where extensive research has been done it is often by ‘insiders’ – people with inside, first-hand experience or specialist knowledge of these networks. Similarly, Islamic communal networks in Britain are also of great contemporary socio-legal importance but the study of them seems surprisingly marginal alongside the mainstream topics of SLS research. Among major reasons that can be suggested are their cultural complexity and diversity and the difficulty sometimes posed for outsiders in gaining adequate conditions of entry into them. So, it is not easy to study these networks by ‘cultural immersion’ (the term favoured by some comparative lawyers)​[39]​ aimed at ‘thick description’ of culture. Muslim and other minority communal networks have attracted a large amount of socio-legal research in many countries. But this has usually been done by scholars outside the SLS mainstream who are members of these networks or have special experience of them, and findings are often not strongly linked to any wider themes in the socio-legal literature.


VALUES IN SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY

Studying values in culture empirically is surely difficult. ‘Cultural immersion’ is a time-consuming activity requiring great sensitivity and perception from the researcher; the conditions for undertaking it may often be hard to secure. Although legal scholars have advocated this kind of research, it is professional anthropologists who have been its main practitioners in socio-legal inquiries.​[40]​ But can socio-legal theory help to clarify the position of ultimate values among the range of cultural research concerns that SLS should recognise? In this final section I shall suggest that it can.

If the regulation of communal networks is accepted as an important focus for socio-legal inquiry, as this paper recommends, it can be recognised that much of this regulation often arises internally, produced in the networks themselves. This was emphasised from the very beginnings of modern sociology of law in Eugen Ehrlich’s famous idea of the ‘living law’ of social associations.​[41]​ Some regulation internal to communal networks is readily recognised as law, especially when the network is a political society in which governmental regulation is guaranteed by the state. But many communal networks are also regulated from ‘outside’ so as to co-ordinate their relations with others. Thus the law of modern liberal states is assumed to have the task of establishing peaceful, productive relations between communal networks in its jurisdiction, and limiting the reach of their regulatory power. 

Liberal law does this primarily by guaranteeing equal citizenship and uniform individual rights not dependent on individuals’ status in any particular communal network within the state. And it polices, to some extent, rights of entry and exit from communal networks (for example, setting itself against racial, sexual and other kinds of discrimination). It is assumed that complex modern societies need to ensure much freedom for people to move in and between as many communal networks as they wish. This is, of course, a value-judgment underlying much of modern law. But can anything be said about this value-judgment from a socio-legal perspective?

Socio-legal research surely cannot as science prescribe ultimate values to guide law. But where value choices are to be made it should be possible to advise about the likely social effects of these choices. Social research can also potentially explain the social conditions in which certain value choices are likely to seem meaningful or even obvious to people; it can explain conditions that define what are likely to be seen as the parameters of meaningful debate around values – that is, what value commitments will be seen as reasonable or at least matters for legitimate discussion and which as ‘off the wall’ and not likely to be seriously entertained in a given time and place. When and why, for example, do the rights and wrongs of slavery, abortion, or capital punishment become live issues? 

Durkheim seemed to go very far in suggesting that sociology could clarify and inform value debates. He wrote that ‘science can help in finding the direction in which our conduct ought to go, assisting us to determine the ideal that gropingly we seek’ and ‘having observed reality… we shall distil the ideal from it’.​[42]​ On this view, sociology can indicate what the consequences of adherence to certain values might be and so can suggest their appropriateness or otherwise depending on whether or not the indicated consequences are desired. Durkheim thought that social solidarity – the harmonious integration of society – was a desirable value and, at the same time, a social fact produced by the ties of interdependence without which complex modern societies could not function. But this apparent eliding of value and fact involves a sleight of hand that most social scientists would reject. A similar criticism can be levelled at Philip Selznick’s sociology of law when it appears to assume that a value of legality is actually inherent in law as an empirically observable social phenomenon.​[43]​ 

A choice to pursue actively the co-ordination and integration of communal networks through law – and to select which networks to support and which to repress or ignore – involves value commitments. So, solidarity is a value that may or may not be pursued. Social research can do no more than try to show the consequences of pursuing it or not. The strongest part of Durkheim’s claims about solidarity is his argument that complex modern societies require elaborate co-ordination and functional integration of their diverse elements if they are to be most fully productive, peaceful and liberating environments for all their members.​[44]​ So, the value of solidarity in such contexts is likely to become a meaningful one; societies can ignore this value but there are crucial reasons not to. Then many questions remain to be asked as to how law can relate to this chosen value, how law expresses it and how law undermines possibilities of acting on it. And these are issues that fall directly within the capacities of socio-legal research. To the extent that social co-ordination and integration seem pressing issues, the socio-legal conditions of solidarity become important for the agenda of research.

Some co-ordination between communal networks and among individuals irrespective of the various networks to which they belong could presumably be structured by any of the elements of culture and types of communal relations discussed earlier. Bonds of solidarity could arise from shared experience and common conditions of co-existence that transcend the boundaries of particular communal networks, or from ties of common or convergent economic relations crossing these boundaries, or from shared values, beliefs or affective ties that transcend groups or networks. But experience and traditions can isolate as much as integrate, emotional ties can be strong but volatile, and instrumental ties of common interest can be transient, ephemeral and changeable. Especially where communal networks tend towards relative ‘closure’, as considered earlier, none of these means of co-ordination with the social world beyond the network may be sufficiently strong and reliable.​[45]​

Durkheim’s answer was that only a strong commitment to a value system of moral individualism was consistent with the needs of integration in complex modern societies.​[46]​ Individuals may have many different and shifting group allegiances; different structures of economic relations and opportunities; and different ethnic identifications, customary ways and well-rooted traditions. In such circumstances all that can unite people morally across these numerous social divides is a humanistic insistence on the universal worth of each and every individual simply by virtue of that individual’s equal humanity alongside all others. This is moral individualism. In societies becoming increasingly complex, the co-ordination and stable integration of social life seems not only more elusive, contingent and fragile but also more essential. These conditions suggest the relevance of a humanistic value system enshrined in law and actively promoted in government policy and perhaps educational practice. Social observation does not mandate ultimate values but indicates conditions in which they may seem meaningful and pertinent, and social research can suggest how to act on these values.

Following this line of argument, it is unsurprising that concerns with human rights and dignity dominate so much contemporary legal thinking in complex modern societies. They reflect directly the value system of moral individualism​[47]​ but are only the most general and explicit legal expression of it; other aspects of law are at least partially informed by it.​[48]​ Moral individualism demands respect for individuals in certain crucial ways across all boundaries of communal relations. It also suggests reasons for state legal concern with communal networks that become so isolated through tendencies towards cultural closure that they threaten to undermine wider conditions of solidarity within the state’s claimed jurisdiction. 
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